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Abstract 
Generous social security contributed to the dramatic rise of the ratio between the 
number of workers and those receiving government benefits in The Netherlands, from 
less than 0.5 in 1970 to over 0.8 in 1990. The resuhing increase of the wedge - the 
difference between gross labour costs and net wages - has, both at the demand side and 
the supply side, further disencouraged labour participation, which again resulted in 
higher demand for social security. Our paper discusses this negative spiral using a 
simulation model which quantifies the major relationships with respect to labour 
participation and social security in a consistent way. Firstly, in a cliometric simulation, 
we show how economie developments in The Netherlands would have looked lïke if the 
demand for social security (more specifically the amount paid for social security 
benefits) would not have increased relative to national income in the last two decades. 
Secondly, a number of scenarios shows how the welfare state can be reconstructed by 
restricting the demand for social security, and hence how the negative spiral of labour 
participation and social security can be curbed in the future. 
1. Introduction 
An extended and generous social security system is often associated with a highly devel-
oped welfare state. From that point of view The Netherlands should be regarded as 
such. However, the costs of maintaining the system of social security in The Nether-
i lands have become extremely high and labour participation has strongly decreased, so 
•' that welfare is at stake just because of the generous social security system. The present 
: level of social security may no longer reflect policy preferences, nor does it necessarily 
J reflect past preferences since in the design of the social security system no such high 
'' costs were anticipated. Therefore, the political views on welfare and social security have 
shifted recently in The Netherlands. The crucial policy question in this respect is about 
the role and prospects of the government in enhancing social welfare. More specifically 
the question is what services the government should provide in order to promote social 
welfare and to what extent, for instance, the provision of social insurance should be left 
' to the private sector. 
: Against this background the present paper provides a quantitative analysis of the mutual 
relationships between the demand for social security, labour participation and economie 
•activity. After a short historical overview of economie thinking about these relationships 
in The Netherlands in the next section, Section 3 presents an allocation model for labour 
* Applied Labour Economics Research Team (ALERT), Free University, De 
Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Hans Vijlbrief is presently at 
the Ministry of Economie Affairs. We are grateful to Jaap Abbring and Martien Brander 
for excellent research assistance. 
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rather small. 
Table 1 Earners in the public sector and the private sector, in 1,000 
labour years 
1 Active persons in the public sector * 
a Government and aocial funds 
b Semi-public sector 
Total 
2 Inactive persons in the public sector with 
benefits in virtue of 
a Old Age Pensions/Widows and Orphans Act (AOW and AWW) 
b Occupational disability (WAO) 
c Temporary illness 
d Unemployment 
e Early retirement (VUT) 
f Public assistance (incl. artists arrangement etc.) 
ToUl (a - f) 
3 Earners in the public sector (1 +2) 
4 Earners in the private sector * 
Earners in the public sector as a percentage 
of earners in the private sector (3/4) 
Inactive persons as a percentage of active 
persons (2/(1+4)) 
Government expenditure as a percentage of national 
income 
Size of the wedge (as a percentage of gross wage costs) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 
542 598 668 697 
201 300 337 369 
743 898 1005 1066 1083 1088 
1502 
188 
229 
82 
0 
79 
1681 1853 
299 502 
302 
201 
0 
114 
325 
237 
8 
127 
585 
267 
613 
35 
185 
682 
354 
498 
70 
175 
697 
358 
482 
70 
176 
2080 2597 3052 
2823 3495 4057 
3720 3474 3473 
1992 
691 688 683 
392 400 413 
1096 
1962 2145 2171 2195 
715 
331 
502 
70 
176 
3647 3924 3954 3989 
4713 5007 5042 5085 
3264 3590 3627 3641 
75.9 100.6 116.8 144.4 139.5 139.0 139.7 
46.6 59.4 68.2 84.2 84.0 83.9 84.2 
33.0 41.3 47.1 46.2 50.5 52.0 51.9 
39.2 47.5 51.3 54.5 60.4 60.8 61.1 
a Exclusive of temporary illness. 
Source: De Nederiandsche Bank; last two Unes: sourees menu'oned in appendix. 
The last lines of table 1 contain data on the share of public expenditure in national 
income and the size of the wedge (gross wage costs minus net wage income as a 
percentage of gross earned wages). According to both statistics the relative size of the 
public sector appears to have increased with approximately 20 %-points during the 
last two decades.2 
The presentation of the data in table 1 forms the starting point for the model based 
analysis of social security which is discussed in the next two sections. The current 
simulation model exploits quantitative research of others on the relationship between 
social security and the rest of the economy. In this respect we mention Den Butter 
2
 The data on the share of public expenditure are based on the data sources used in 
our simulation model and do not comprise, amongst other things, local authonties public 
expenditure. Therefore our numbers are somewhat lower than those of the policy 
discussions. 
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Figure 1 Graphical representation of the allocation model 
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in the present context. When more people become active in the production process 
economie activity will increase, not only because of the input of productive capacity which 
remains idle in the case of non-participation, but also because the employment of this 
productive capacity enlarges human capital by learning by doing, while on the other hand 
human capital depreciates when it remains unused (see Bastianen et al., 1993 for the 
distinction between primary and secondary social costs in case of non-participation). 
Consequently, the enhanced economie activity induces higher tax receipts of the govem-
ment. On the other hand, a rise in the number of non-participants receiving social security 
benefits leads to an increase in govemment expenditure. The size of this increase depends, 
among other things, on the benefit level. 
The govemment budget confronts govemment expenditure with income from taxes and 
social security premiums. When expenditures rise, for instance because of an increase in 
the number of people receiving benefits, higher expenditures can be financed in two ways, 
namely by enlarging the govemment deficit or by an increase in the wedge between gross 
wage costs and net wages. An increase in the govemment deficit, indicated in the figure by 
a diamond as a possible instrument of govemment policy, is not feasible in the present 
economie and political situation in The Netherlands. That is why a rise in the demand for 
social security nowadays almost automatically implies that the wedge between net wages 
and gross wage costs becomes larger. Moreover, this endogeneity of the wedge is also 
institutionally determined as social funds are financed on a balanced budget basis. Figure 1 
clearly illustrates this central and crucial role of the wedge and the respective mechanism 
which determines labour participation and the demand for social security. A rise in the 
wedge leads to labour market discouragement, because both labour demand and labour 
supply decrease. Hence, the number of non-participants rises. This sets in motion a new 
part of the spiral of higher govemment expenditure and a larger wedge. 
The figure also points out another negative spiral: because of the decrease of the produc-
tive capacity in case of low labour participation economie activity falls, so that the 
government's income from taxes and social security premiums decreases, inducing the 
wedge to rise still further. 
A reversal of these two negative spirals is essential for the future of the Dutch welfare 
state. The diamonds of the figure symbolize the instruments of the govemment by means 
of which it can effectuate such a reversal. Of course, another effective instrument which 
has been extensively used in The Netherlands during the eighties is that of a wage 
restraint. A wage restraint can contribute to the reversal of the spiral, especially when the 
benefit level is linked to the wage level. 
The simulation model is centred around the allocation model which describes the 
breakdown of the total working age population, determined by demographic factors, into 
the three categories which we distinguish. This allocation model is reminiscent of a 
portfolio model according to which financial wealth is allocated to various assets. 
We now explain the equations of the model (see Annex). Equations (1) and (2) describe 
the size of the working age population and the number of people receiving benefits from 
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progress). Contractual working time is also relevant in this respect (eq. 7). An increase in 
employment, due to this labour demand variable, leads to a larger share of active workers 
in the market sector and, consequently, to a decrease in the share of non-participants. Real 
wage costs, corrected for increases in productivity, act as second determinant of labour 
demand and have an opposite effect. A rise in wage costs induces labour demand to fall 
and the share of non-participants to rise. 
The wedge is the third determinant of the allocation model and relates to labour supply. 
An increase in the wedge is associated with the discouragement of labour supply and, 
hence, with an increase in non-participation, so that both the share of the non-participants 
receiving a benefit and that of those who do not receive a benefit increases. The wage 
benefit ratio or replacement ratio is the fourth determinant. A rise in the benefit level also 
leads to less labour supply. In this case, substitution within the allocation model mainly 
takes place between active workers and non-participants receiving a benefit. A regress of 
social climate, the fifth determinant of the allocation model, also leads to an increase in 
the share of non-participants receiving a benefit. Finally, for technical reasons, we have 
included labour participation of women as a determinant of the allocation. An increase of 
female labour participation (which, by the way, is rather low in The Netherlands as 
compared to other Western industrialised countries) leads to a higher share of both the 
active workers and non-participants receiving a benefit. Equations (9) and (9a) describe 
technical relationships between the wedge, gross wage costs and net wages. Equation (10) 
defines the replacement ratio. 
Generally, the model considers both the salaries of civil servants and the level of benefits 
(both to non-participants who belong to the working age population and to old age 
pensioners) as an autonomous instrument of the government. As an alternative, equation 
(11) describes the policy practice during a major part of the reference period, namely that 
of a linkage of salaries of civil servants and workers in the semi-public sector to gross 
wages in the market sector. In the case that the value of parameter a, equals unity we 
have complete linkage. Accordingly, equations (12) and (13) define the linkage of benefits 
and net wages. The model considers gross wages as autonomous as well, so that we are 
able to compute the consequences of a policy of wage restraint without induced feedback 
mechanisms through the wage equation. As an alternative, equation (14) gives a very 
simple specification of a wage equation in which gross wages depend on labour productiv-
ity. The specification of the wage equation is deliberately held simple in order to leave 
various aspects of wage formation out of consideration in the model simulations. 
The next set of equations of the model describes the government budget. Equations (15), 
(16) and (17) determine government expenditures, namely for salaries and for the payment 
of benefits. Equation (18) is a technical equation for indirect taxes. Equation (19) 
calculates desired government income from direct taxes and social security premiums as a 
residual of the budget restriction. The model assumes that government expenditure, given 
indirect taxes and the size of the government deficit, is completely financed out of taxes 
and social security premiums. This determines the size of the wedge (equation 20). 
Equations (21) and (22) are related definitions of the wedge which are used elsewhere in 
the model. 
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The long run labour demand elasticity of labour costs is set equal to -0.5 (see Den Butter, 
1991, for a survey of empirical evidence for The Netherlands). Again the assumption is 
made of a proportional distribution over both other categories. 
Empirical studies of the influence of the wedge, or net wages, on labour supply indicate a 
long term elasticity of 0.2 (see e.g. Theeuwes, 1988). The parameter value of the wedge in 
the first equation of the allocation model is set in accordance to this elasticity. Here the 
wedge is defined as the burden of taxes and premiums for workers (the burden for 
employers is included in the labour costs). Again a proportional distribution over both 
other categories is assumed. 
We assume that the long run labour supply elasticity of the benefit wage ratio is rather 
small, namely -0.2. We have modelled the influence of the replacement ratio in the alloca-
tion model in such a manner that a rise in this ratio only induces a shift in the shares of 
active workers and non-participants receiving a benefit. We do so because there is no 
evidence on a possible influence of changes in the replacement ratio on the allocation of 
non-participants between those receiving benefits and those not receiving benefits. If these 
latter changes in allocation would take place it would, by the way, imply a direct form of 
rent seeking behaviour: it would suggest that if benefit levels go up, more people seek 
eligibility for benefits without the intention to participate as active worker. 
Increased participation of women is equally distributed over workers in the market sector 
and non-participants receiving benefits. The parameter values of the allocation model are 
calculated in such a manner that they are, in the mean of the reference period, in accord-
ance with the chosen values of the long term elasticities. The respective values are given in 
table A. 1 of the Annex. 
After these parameter values were established, the constant terms of the allocation model 
(which should add up to 0.5 because of the distributed lag) and the values of the coeffi-
cients with respect to the social climate variable have been determined by means of 
regression analysis. We have valued social climate by means of proxy ( m i n a priori basis 
(5 in 1969-1974,4 in 1975-1981,3 in 1981-1982,2 in 1983-1985 en 1 from 1986 onwards). 
When estimating the coëfficiënt value of this variable, there appears to be a striking 
similarity between the values of the proxy and the trend of the residual of the allocation 
model (see figure 3). It appears that social climate mainly describes a reallocation between 
active workers and non-participants receiving a benefit. A low value of the proxy for social 
climate is associated with active workers moving to the part of the basin of non-partici-
pants receiving benefits. The influence on non-participants not receiving a benefit appears 
to be rather small. Therefore, we do not show the residual share of this category in figure 
3. Obviously it does not make much difference for the simulation results when, as an 
alteraative to the proxy for social climate, we would have foliowed the procedure of 
describing social climate by means of the trend value of the residual of the allocation 
model. 
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tions of social security, it is only in a genera! sense that we do refer to policy measures as 
'price policies' or 'volume policies'. 
Firstly we present the results of two cliometric simulations. Such simulations show how 
economie development in the past would have looked like, if some events would have 
occurred that in fact did not occur (or if some events would not have occurred that in fact 
did occur). Table 2 shows how the Dutch economy would have developed from 1970 
onwards, if the expenditures on social security (relative to real national income) had been 
constant. This simulation tries to visualise the idea politicians had on the future costs of 
social security at the start of the consolidation face of the system of social security at the 
beginning of 1970's. How would economie development have looked like if, at that time, 
not the benefit level, but the cost of social security had been hold constant? In order to 
simulate this budgeting of social security, we have respecified the model in such a manner 
that no longer expenditures on social security determine the wedge, but that, given the 
wedge, a fixed amount is available for social security expenditures. It implies that an 
increase in the number of persons eligible for benefits leads, c.p.,to a reduction in the 
benefit level. The results of table 2 give the difference between the dynamic simulation of 
the past in which the value of the wedge is equal to its actual value (baseline projection) 
and a dynamic simulation (alternative projection) in which the wedge is kept constant. 
Table 2 Indicators for the relative size of the public sector in the case of a wedge held 
constant at the level of 1970 (deviations from baseline projection) 
1975 1980 1985 1990 
Economie activity 
Employment 
Government expenditure as a percentage of 
national income 
Size of wedge (as a percentage of 
gross wage costs) 
Earners in the public sector as a percentage 
of earners in the private sector 
Inactive persons as a percentage of active 
persons 
% 5.0 5.6 7.3 10.9 
% 10.3 11.4 15.0 22.9 
%-p -5.9 -7.6 -7.9 -12.3 
%-p -10.1 -12.9 -16.1 -24.6 
%-p -19.1 -22.7 -30.9 -48.3 
%-p -11.5 -13.2 -17.7 -27.7 
Explanatory note: % percentage difference from baseline projection 
%-p percentage-pointe difference from baseline projection 
Table 2 shows that the actual increase of the wedge and the induced discouragement to 
participate in the labour market has had a rather large negative effect on economie activity 
and employment. Our keynote figures with respect to the productive basis only display a 
minor increase in case of a constant wedge. 
Table 3 pictures the economie development when social climate would have remained at 
the level of 1970. Although this cliometric simulation is governed by quite another 
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simulation assumes that social climate will return to its value of 1970 (from 1 in 1991 to 5 
in 1995 en 1996). The main results are completely in accordance with our intuition and we 
would not have needed a modelling exercise for it: such fast restraint on the eligibility for 
social security would most favourably affect labour participation, the productive basis and, 
hence, economie activity. Of course this scenario highly exaggerates what is (politically) 
conceivable in reality. Moreover, modelling volume policies by means of the social climate 
proxy does not give a clue of how actual policies should be implemented (see the next 
section). Yet, the simulation illustrates the importance of a policy directed at solving the 
moral hazard and rent seeking problems of social security. Present policy proposals in The 
Netherlands include a number of specific measures in order to achieve such a reduction in 
the demand for social security. We note that similar measures are part of the 'European 
Renaissance' scenario of the Central Planning Bureau (1992b). 
Table 4 Indicators for the relative size of the public sector; extrapoiation according to 
the distribution model (baseline projection for the future scenarios) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Government expenditure as a percentage of 
national income 
Size of wedge (as a percentage of 
gross wage costs) 
Eamers in the public sector as a percentage 
of eamers in the private sector 
Inactive persons as a percentage of active 
persons 
51.9 47.1 49.0 48.8 48.6 
61.1 61.1 60.9 60.5 60.1 
144.7 145.1 145.0 144.5 143.8 
87.1 87.8 88.0 88.1 88.1 
Table 5 Indicators for the relative size of the public sector; implications of a volume 
measure (deviations from baseline projection) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Economie activity % 1.0 2.7 4.9 7.2 8.7 
Employment % 2.0 5.6 10.0 14.8 18.1 
Government expenditure as a 
percentage of national income %-p -1.0 -2.4 -4.3 -6.1 -7.1 
Size of wedge (as a percentage 
of gross wage costs) %-p -2.2 -5.6 -9.7 -13.8 -16.2 
Eamers in the public sector as a percentage 
of eamers in the private sector %-p -6.0 -15.4 -25.8 -35.9 -41.5 
Inactive persons as a percentage 
of active persons %-p -3.5 -9.0 -15.2 -21.4 -24.9 
Explanatory note: % percentage difference from baseline projection 
%-p percentage-points difference from baseline projection 
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pensioners, who account for more than half of the number of persons receiving benefits, 
are included in the policy measure. The reason is that the reduction in old age pensions 
only indirectly, by way of the wedge, induces a higher labour participation, whereas accord-
ing to the model a reduction in the benefit level of the other recipients of benefits 
enhances labour participation directly as well as through second order effects. In this case 
the supply effect induces a strong spiralling mechanism. 
As a final scenario for the future table 7 shows the effects of a reduction of the number of 
civil servants and workers in the semi-public sector. We assume an additional 2 % 
reduction each year from 1992 onwards (i.e. 2 % reduction in 1992,4 % reduction in 1993 
etc.). This policy of restraint implies that, as expected, the size of the public sector 
becomes smaller. On the other hand, not all superfluous public servants will find a job in 
the market sector. The net result according to the model is that this policy measure leads 
to a decrease of employment, so that the ratio of workers and non-participants receiving a 
benefit further increases. After a temporary decrease even the wedge comes out at a 
higher level at the end of the simulation period as compared to the central projection. This 
outcome of the model partly is the consequence of the assumption that civil servants and 
workers in the semi-public sector contribute to national income and that consequently, 
whenever they get dismissed and become unemployed the productive basis and economie 
activity decreases. This again leads to a fall of labour demand in the market sector. 
Table 7 Indicators for the rdative size of the public sector; implications of a cut in the 
employment in the public en semi-public sector (deviations from baseline 
projection) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Economie activity % -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 -1.5 
Employment % -0.4 -1.0 -1.6 -2.2 -2.9 
Government expenditure as a 
percentage of national income %-p -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 
Size of wedge (as a percentage 
of gross wage costs) %-p -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.0 0.1 
Earners in the public sector as a percentage 
of earners in the private sector %-p -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 
Inactive persons as a percentage 
of active persons %-p 0.5 1.1 1.9 2.7 3.5 
Explanatory note: see table 5. 
5 Conclusion: social securitv and the welfare state 
This paper finds its inspiration in the observation that the generous and extended social 
security system in The Netherlands may have become an obstacle for welfare by decreasing 
labour participation and economie activity. The cliometric simulations of Section 4 clearly 
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records of an industry, may enhance the efficiency of social security and reduce the 
number of benefit recipients. 
The Dutch welfare state is endangered by the effects of social security on labour participa-
tion and economie activity. There are two negative spirals, which have led to a steady 
increase in the costs of social security, and to a fall in the productive basis for social 
security. Our simulation model offers a first step for a quantitative analysis of the linkages 
between the demand for social security, labour participation and economie activity in The 
Netherlands. The scenarios for the future indicate that the negative spirals can be reversed, 
either by a reduction in social security benefits or by bringing the social climate back to its 
1970 level. The reconstruction of the Dutch welfare state implies a choice between creating 
a less generous social security system through price policies or making social security more 
affordable by means of volume policies. Although the latter policies may take some time to 
become effective and involve a risk with regard to a quick reduction in the costs of social 
security in The Netherlands, they are worth trying before harsher policies are applied. 
ANNEX The model 
Model equations 
Demografv 
B„ = B M + T J B J ^ - X ^ ^ J - T3Bb j (1) 
Bmr=B,„„_j + I ^ b _ j - T 3 „ _ j (2) 
Allocation model 
B h ' « B b - B 0 - B . . (3) 
BJB
 b* = 0.5 (BJB.;).! + ft» + frnAv + AJ„' + ft^wed.' + fl^uv + 
Psjc + ^ v r (4) 
BJB „'= 0.5 (BJB
 b*)_j + ft* + 0luAv + &Jb ' + &jwed.' + ft^iv + 
/Ssu^ c + fl^vr (5) 
BJB „'= 0.5 (BJB „O.j + Ah, + /3,»AV + jSjJ,; + &j*e&; + ft^iv + 
ftrfc + flfcyr (6) 
with parameter restrictions 
1,(3,* = 0.5, x = m, ui, zu 
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wed.' = (1 - wed J (22) 
Supplv effect of labour participation 
y = y„ (part/part „ J 7 (23) 
withpart = (Bm + B0 + B J / B„ (24) 
and part ^ the average participation rate over the reference period 
Parameter values 
Table A.1 gives the parameter values of the allocation model which correspond to the 
selected values of the long term elasticities reported in the main text. In case linkage 
equations are included in the model simulations, they describe a full linkage: a, = a2 = 
a3 = 1. The coëfficiënt 7 is set equal to 0.5. 
Table A.1 Parameter values of the allocation model 
& m ui zu 
KA,) 0.41 -0.10 -0.31 
2 (lb') -4.010"6 1.0 HT6 3.110-* 
3 (wed.') 0.065 -0.016 -0.050 
4(uv) -5.010-' 5.0 10u 0 
5 (se) 0.0064 -0.0072 0.0008 
6(vr) 0.0013 0.0013 -0.0025 
Explanatory note: parameter values do not exactly suffice the restrictions due to rounding 
errors 
Symbob 
ap 
ap' 
Trend of labour productivity 
Labour productivity 
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vr Trend of female participation rate 
wed Wedge between gross wage costs and net wages 
wed. Tax and premium burden for workers 
y National income (constant prices) 
y n Idem, determined exogenously by aggregate demand 
T ( Ratio of pupulation under 15 which obtains working age 
T 2 Ratio of working age population of those who leave the working age popula-
tion (by deceases, net emigration) 
T 3 Ratio of working age population of those who become eligible for an old age 
or widow's pension 
TT4 Ratio of number of persons eligible for an old age or widow's pension and of 
the number of persons leaving this category (by deceases, net emigration, 
remarrying) 
r Indirect tax rate 
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